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LITERARY THICKNESS 
Rafe McGregor 
 
 
 
In this paper, I shall demonstrate the value of the concept of literary thickness – i.e. form-
content inseparability – as a tool of literary appreciation.  I set out the relationships between 
non-fiction, fiction, literature, and poetry in section 1 and sketch a preliminary definition of 
literary thickness in section 2.  I argue that a convincing account of reference in literary 
fictions can be provided by means of literary thickness in sections 3 and 4.  I argue that the 
match between authorial intention and reader response characteristic of the experience of 
literary works is explained by literary thickness in section 5.  In section 6, I test the 
usefulness of the concept of literary thickness against Peter Carey’s True History of the Kelly 
Gang. 
 
1. Fiction & Literature 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I shall adopt the standard philosophical account of the 
distinction between fiction and non-fiction – despite the pressure to which it has recently 
been subjected.1  Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen offer a much-cited version of this 
account as follows: 
                                                 
1 In particular, see: Stacie Friend, “Fiction as a Genre,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXII (2012), 
179-209 and Derek Matravers, Fiction and Narrative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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 the fictive dimension of stories (or narratives) is explicable only in terms of a rule-
 governed practice, central to which are a certain mode of utterance (fictive utterance) 
 and a certain complex of attitudes (the fictive stance).2  
To create a work of fiction in an oral or written tradition is to make a fictive utterance and to 
experience that work as a work of fiction is to adopt the fictive stance.  As Stacie Friend 
notes, the standard account is reliant upon the distinctive roles of imagination and belief in 
the two categories: a fictive utterance invites readers to imagine its contents while a factive 
utterance invites readers to believe its contents.3  Just as Lamarque and Olsen conceive of a 
fictive work as a fictive utterance, so a literary work is identified on the basis of the intention 
of the author, specifically ‘the intention to invoke a literary response.’4  Similarly, to read a 
text as literature is to adopt the literary stance: 
 Adopting the literary stance towards a text is to identify it as a literary work and 
 apprehend it in accordance with the conventions of the literary practice.  The mode of 
 apprehension which the practice defines is one of appreciation.5 
To appreciate a work is to recognise its value; specifically, to grasp the literary value of a 
literary work.  The concepts of fiction and literature are clearly not coextensive, however, as 
there are works of fiction that are not works of literature and works of literature that are not 
works of fiction. 
 
In the former case, this may be because the work belongs to another art form, for example a 
cinematic work, such as Christopher Nolan’s Memento; or because the work does not aspire 
to a distinctively literary kind of attention, for example Agatha Christie’s And Then There 
Were None.  The category of literary works that are not fictional includes historical, 
                                                 
2 Peter Lamarque & Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2002), 32. 
3 Friend, “Fiction as a Genre,” 182. 
4 Lamarque & Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 256. 
5 Lamarque & Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 256. 
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documentary, and philosophical works – such as William H. Prescott’s History of the 
Conquest of Peru, George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia, and Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, A Book for All and None – which are judged to have literary value.6  I 
shall take “fiction” as a descriptive concept and “literature” as an evaluative one: Ulysses and 
And Then There Were None are both fictional works, but only Ulysses is (also) a literary 
work, i.e. both invites and rewards literary attention.  Despite the significance of the 
differences between fiction and literature, and the historical problems in the relationship to 
which Lamarque and Olsen allude, they hold that ‘literature for the most part consists of 
stories that are either invented by the author or are mythical or legendary in character’.7  I 
shall take the literary stance as characteristically incorporating the fictive stance, accepting 
Olsen’s claim that ‘the assumption that literature is invention and imagination, “story” and 
not “history”, is central to literary practice’, employing “literature” to refer to this inventive, 
imaginative sub-category of works.8  “Literary work” should therefore be understood as 
synonymous with “literary fiction” hereafter. 
 
Literature as delineated above is an art form and to adopt the literary stance to a text is to 
experience the text as a work of art.  I do not wish to commit to a definition of art, but the 
characterisations of fiction and literature I have accepted – particularly the references to 
“practices” and “conventions” – are compatible with the institutional theory of art.  George 
Dickie is the leading proponent of this theory and his version is based on a series of five 
interlocking definitions – artist, work, public, artworld, and artworld system – with a work of 
art defined as ‘an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public.’9  Dickie is 
unconcerned by the circularity of the definition because its function is not identification, but 
                                                 
6 Some lyric poetry is also categorised as literary non-fiction. 
7 Lamarque & Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 268. 
8 Stein Haugom Olsen, The End of Literary Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 160. 
9 George Dickie, The Art Circle (New York: Haven, 1984), 80. 
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the clarification and explanation of an already familiar term: ‘Virtually everyone can 
recognize some things as works of art’.10  I shall take this to be true of some works of literary 
art and focus on two works whose status as literature is uncontested.  The literary stance and 
the author’s intention to invoke this stance are reliant upon the practice of literature, the set of 
concepts and conventions that constitute the institutional framework within which literary 
works are presented and received.   
 
2. Form & Content 
 
Plato11 distinguished the ‘style’ of stories from their ‘content’ and while there has been 
philosophical interest in the relationship between form and content ever since, A.C. Bradley’s 
“Poetry for Poetry’s Sake” lecture marks the beginning of the contemporary concern.12  In a 
previous paper, I developed Bradley’s largely unsubstantiated argument for form-content 
inseparability in the light of subsequent work by I.A. Richards13 and Lamarque,14 proposing a 
reciprocal relationship between form and content he calls poetic thickness.15  Recently, I have 
further argued that there is a similarly close relationship between form and content in literary 
narratives, called narrative thickness.16  I want to subsume both of these instantiations under 
a single concept that is applicable to all works of literary art, both poetic and narrative.  With 
this aim in mind, it is interesting to consider Anna Christina Ribeiro’s explanation of the 
characteristics that typically (rather than necessarily) set poetic works apart from other works 
of literature: 
                                                 
10 Dickie, The Art Circle, 79. 
11 Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube & C.D.C. Reeve, in J.M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 971-1223, III: 392c5-7. 
12 A.C. Bradley, “Poetry for Poetry’s Sake,” in A.C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: Macmillan, 
1959), 3-34. 
13 I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co, 1930) and 
Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment (London: Routledge, 1978). 
14 Peter Lamarque, “The Elusiveness of Poetic Meaning,” Ratio 22 (2009), 398-420.   
15 Rafe McGregor, “Poetic Thickness,” British Journal of Aesthetics 54 (2014), 49-64. 
16 Rafe McGregor, “Narrative Thickness,” Estetika LII (2015), 3-22. 
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(1) most poems are lyric poems written in the first person; (2) most poems are formal; 
indeed, most are highly formal; and (3) most poems use figurative language – 
metaphors, similes, imagery, and so on, to a greater, often much greater, extent than 
other literary forms.17 
 
All three of these characteristics (four, if one counts the first person voice) – musical quality, 
formal salience, and tropes are also associated with literary narratives, albeit (as Ribeiro 
notes) standardly to a lesser extent.  The three are also all formal rather than substantive 
features and my claim is that all three categories of literary art – poems, plays, and novels 
(including shorter novellas and even shorter short stories) – share a common set of formal 
and substantive features.  Literary form includes structure, morphology (the patterns of word 
formation), syntax (the rules of sentence formation), metre (the arrangement of words in 
regularly measured, patterned, or rhythmic lines or verses), and tropes (all literary or 
rhetorical devices that use words in other than their literal sense).  Content includes subject, 
theme, characters, settings, and events.  Following Plato, Bradley offers a simple and 
effective description of the distinction:  form is how a poet says something; content is what 
the poet says.18  My poetic thickness and narrative thickness can thus be subsumed under a 
preliminary definition of literary thickness as follows:  
LITERARY THICKNESS I: the inseparability of literary form and literary content in 
the experience of a literary work such that neither form nor content can be isolated.  
Literary thickness is a demand which is satisfied by a work and is characteristic of 
literature such that if a work is a work of literature, it will reward the demand for 
literary thickness. 
                                                 
17 Anna Christina Ribeiro, “Towards a Philosophy of Poetry,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXIII (2009), 
61-77: 66. 
18 Bradley, “Poetry for Poetry’s Sake,” 7-8.  See also Plato, Republic III: 394c8-10. 
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Literary thickness is consistent with my previous claim that not all works will reward the 
demand.19  The demand should therefore be understood as twofold, from both the reader and 
the work, as suggested by Malcolm Budd: ‘the experience a work offers is an experience of 
interacting with it in whatever way it demands if it is to be understood.’20  The demand made 
by the work is determined by the intention and ability of the author such that not all works 
that are intended to be appreciated – intended to meet the demand for literary thickness – will 
succeed in this aim.  A work that fails in this way is a work which merely aspires to be 
literary.   
 
The first part of my argument for the value of literary thickness as a tool of literary 
appreciation concerns fictional reference in literary works.  Lamarque and Olsen distinguish 
three views on reference in literature: anti-reference, non-reference, and pro-reference.21  
Anti-reference views include the pragmatic rejection of truth in favour of practical 
consequences and the structuralist and poststructuralist rejection of language providing access 
to reality.  Non-reference views include conceptions of literature as self-referential or 
intertextual, i.e. referring only to other literary fictions.  The former conception was 
particularly popular with New Criticism, the critical movement most closely associated with 
theories of form-content inseparability.  Monroe Beardsley is perhaps the most well-known 
New Critic, maintaining that the literary work is an aesthetic object, self-contained, self-
sufficient, and self-referential.22  The pro-reference view is the most popular in literary 
aesthetics and Friend distinguishes between fictional-object and make-believe theories within 
                                                 
19 McGregor, “Poetic Thickness,” 56. 
20 Malcolm Budd, Values of Art (London: Penguin, 1995), 4. 
21 Lamarque & Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 107. 
22 Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1958), 436-437. 
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this category.23  She advances a version of the latter, in which there is make-believe reference 
to an existent object, in response to Frederick Kroon’s defence of the former, in which there 
is genuine reference to a non-existent object.24  I shall return to the distinction between 
fictional-object and make-believe theories in §4, after elucidating a separate – but related – 
distinction within pro-reference views of literature, between transparency and opacity.  In 
both of the following sections, I shall focus on reference to real rather than fictional names in 
literary works.25   
 
3. Transparency & Opacity 
 
Lamarque differentiates transparency and opacity as follows:   
Only where the mode of narration is salient – in other words where the form in which 
a story is told matters in the appraisal of the narrative – will co-referential 
substitutions be blocked.  Those narratives primarily concerned with imparting 
information – from homely conversational narratives to those of history or biography 
– will normally invite a transparent construal of their proper names and other 
referential devices.26 
Narrative – or fictional – opacity is distinct from, but related to, W.V.O. Quine’s referential 
opacity.  Quine identifies several referentially opaque contexts, where the truth of a sentence 
depends upon something other than the referent such that truth is not preserved in co-
                                                 
23 Stacie Friend, “Real People in Unreal Contexts, or Is There a Spy Among Us?” in A. Everett & T. Hofweber 
(eds.), Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000), 183-203: 
183. 
24 Frederick Kroon, “Make-Believe and Fictional Reference,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 
(1994), 207-214. 
25 I do not have space to discuss reference to fictional names in this paper.  My view – which is consistent with 
my argument for literary thickness – is that fictional names do refer, but to universals rather than particulars. 
26 Peter Lamarque, The Opacity of Narrative (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2014), 146.  The 
initial discussion of narrative opacity is by Lamarque and Olsen, who use the examples of “London” in the 
Sherlock Holmes stories, Tom Jones, and Bleak House (Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 80-82) and “Canterbury” 
in The Canterbury Tales (Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 126-128). 
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referential substitutions.  For example, although “Tegucigalpa” and “the capital of Honduras” 
have the same referent, co-referential substitution transforms true statement (1) into false 
statement (2): 
 (1) ‘Philip believes that Tegucigalpa is in Nicaragua.’27 
 (2) ‘Philip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua.’28 
Fictional opacity is not concerned with the preservation of truth, but with the preservation of 
the identity of the fictional work, specifically with the constraints it places upon one’s 
imaginative engagement with that work.  Lamarque is explicit that ‘narrative opacity also 
shows how form helps determine content in prose narrative.’29  Content is always shaped by 
form in a literary narrative such that the narrative is not transparent, i.e. one does not 
penetrate through the form straight to the content as one would in a philosophical or historical 
work. 
 
Lamarque’s conception of the contrasting degrees of opacity typical of literature and history 
can be demonstrated by comparing Hemingway’s description of André Marty in For Whom 
the Bell Tolls with a passage from Antony Beevor’s historical work, The Spanish Civil War.  
Beevor describes the arrival of volunteers for the International Brigades at Albacete late in 
1936: 
 The recruits were lined up on the parade ground for an address by André Marty, the 
 Brigades’ controller who had earlier brought the French volunteers over the border 
 during the fighting at Irún.  Marty, a squat man, with a white moustache, drooping 
 jowl and outsized beret, had made his name as a signals operator in the 1919 mutiny 
 of the French Black Sea Fleet.  The heroic legend woven around him in Party 
                                                 
27 W.V.O. Quine, “Reference and Modality,” in W.V.O Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-
Philosophical Essays (New York: Harper, 1963), 139-159, 141. 
28 Quine, “Reference and Modality,” 141. 
29 Lamarque, Opacity of Narrative, 154. 
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 mythology made him one of the most powerful figures in the Comintern.  Almost 
 nobody dared challenge his authority.  At that time he was starting to develop a 
 conspiracy complex that rivalled Stalin’s.  Influenced by the show trials in Moscow, 
 he became convinced that “Fascist-Trotskyist” spies were everywhere, and that it was 
 his duty to exterminate them.  Marty later admitted that he had ordered the shooting of 
 about 500 Brigaders, nearly one-tenth of the total killed in the war.  Many claim that 
 Marty’s figure is modest.30   
The interest in the work is typically thin because form and content can be separated.  The 
content – information about people, places, and events – can be separated from the form – the 
way in which Beevor presents them.  The information in the text could be communicated in a 
different way without loss of identity.  “Marty”, “the parade ground”, and “the show trials in 
Moscow” are not presented under an aspect, but transparently.  “Marty” refers to Marty (i.e., 
“Marty” in its fully extensional use), not Marty-in-Beevor’s-The-Spanish-Civil-War (i.e., 
Marty under the aspect Beevor’s The Spanish Civil War licenses one to imagine).  The 
people, places, and events can be described exhaustively without recourse to aspect.  The 
Spanish Civil War is not intended for literary appreciation and my primary interest as a reader 
is with the content: I want to know if Marty really looked and acted as Beevor states, and 
because Beevor is a reputable historian I accept the invitation to believe his description.   
 
Beevor’s description of Marty contrasts with the character who makes a brief and sinister 
appearance in For Whom the Bell Tolls, even though it appears that Hemingway’s portrayal 
of Marty is factually accurate:   
 He recognized his bushy eyebrows, his watery eyes, his chin and the double  
 chin under it, and he knew him for one of France’s great revolutionary figures  
                                                 
30 Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War (London: Cassell & Co., 2001), 184. 
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 who had led the mutiny of the French Navy in the Black Sea.  Gomez knew  
 this man’s high political place in the  International Brigades and he knew this  
 man would know where Golz’s headquarters were and be able to direct him  
 there.  He did not know what this man had become with time, disappointment, 
 bitterness both domestic and political, and thwarted ambition and that to question him 
 was one of the most dangerous things that any man could do.  Knowing nothing of 
 this he stepped forward into the path of this man, saluted with his clenched fist and 
 said, “Comrade Marty, we are the bearers of a dispatch for General Golz.  Can you 
 direct us to his headquarters?  It is urgent.”  
 The tall, heavy old man looked at Gomez with his out-thrust head and considered him 
 carefully with his watery eyes.  Even here at the front in the light of a bare electric 
 bulb, he having just come in from driving in an open car on a brisk night, his gray 
 face had a look of decay.  His face looked as though it were modelled from the waste 
 material you find under the claws of a very old lion.31 
For Whom the Bell Tolls does not authorise one to imagine “the man at the centre of l'affaire 
Marty-Tillon” when one reads “Marty”.  “Marty” in Beevor refers to Marty; “Marty” in 
Hemingway refers to Marty-in-For-Whom-the-Bell-Tolls, i.e. “Marty” presented under an 
aspect rather than in its full extension.  The descriptions of real people, places, and events do 
not license one to invoke just any information about those people, places, and events in one’s 
imaginative engagement with the novel because one’s interest in the work is typically thick.32  
The question of precisely what one is and is not licenced to imagine is particular to each 
literary work, but I have used an uncontroversial example in selecting a part of Marty’s 
biography that occurred after the Spanish Civil War – the scandal which resulted in Marty 
                                                 
31 Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (London: Grafton Books, 1976), 364-365. 
32 For a comprehensive discussion of referential, representational, and narrative opacity, see: Lamarque, The 
Opacity of Narrative, 3-14. 
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being expelled from the Parti communiste français in 1952 – about which Hemingway could 
not have possibly known at the time of writing.33   
 
It would be an error to state that For Whom the Bell Tolls does not refer to Marty, because the 
reader’s experience of the novel is augmented by knowledge of the real Marty.  The 
information from Beevor enhances the aspect under which Marty appears in For Whom the 
Bell Tolls.  Hemingway offers a sketch of the relevant historical information, but the 
additional facts one finds in Beevor flesh out this representation and provide the informed 
reader with a richer and more rewarding experience.  The words he stepped forward into the 
path of this man are that much more chilling with Beevor’s facts to hand than they are 
without, relying only upon Hemingway’s brief biographical description.  For Whom the Bell 
Tolls is intended for literary appreciation and rewards the demand for literary thickness.  I 
accept Hemingway’s invitation to imagine certain things of Marty and my primary interest as 
a reader is with the way in which the content is combined with the form, a notion to which I 
shall return in §5. 
 
4. Fictional-Object Theories & Make-Believe Theories 
 
Friend sets out the contrast between fictional-object and make-believe theories using the 
example of Shakespeare’s Richard III: for the former, “Richard III” involves genuine 
reference to a non-existent object, Shakespeare’s Richard of Gloucester; for the latter, 
“Richard III” involves make-believe reference to an existent object, i.e. we make-believe of 
the real King Richard that – for example – he murdered the princes (regardless of whether he 
did so in reality).  In his defence of the fictional-object theory, Kroon notes that make-believe 
                                                 
33 Friend offers a compelling account of prescriptions to imagine in terms of notion networks.  See: Stacie 
Friend, “The great beetle debate: a study in imagining with names,” Philosophical Studies 153 (2011), 183-211. 
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theorists are committed to real names taking their usual referents, i.e. “Richard of Gloucester” 
in Shakespeare’s Richard III refers to King Richard and “Jim Garrison” in Oliver Stone’s 
JFK refers to Earl Carothers Garrison.34  Kroon identifies a paradox that make-believe 
theorists cannot explain.  The real Garrison might, in the last year of his life, have watched 
JFK.  He might also have both (1) despised himself and (2) admired the character in the 
film.35  As the make-believe theorist is committed to the view that “Jim Garrison” in JFK 
refers to Garrison, she is committed to the view that Garrison hates and admires himself 
simultaneously.  The fictional-object theory involves no such paradox, because Garrison 
hates himself but admires the (non-existent) fictional Garrison.  Kroon concludes that the 
fictional-object theory is therefore preferable to the make-believe theory.36 
 
Friend’s response is to show why the fictional-object theory fails, using an amusing story in 
which two real philosophers, Anthony Everett and John Perry, are revealed to be secret 
agents.  She notes that ‘the proper response to the fiction is to imagine, to make believe, that 
what is true in the fiction, really is true, that the events it narrates really have taken place’.37  
Friend asks whether imagining Everett as a secret agent is imagining about the real Everett or 
imagining about a fictional Everett.  She maintains the former, the consequence of which is 
that “Everett” can be substituted with any co-referential expression.38  Her evidence to 
support this claim is the response of the audience (which includes Everett): even though the 
audience know the story is fictional, they will still be imagining of and thinking about the 
philosopher in their midst as a spy.  The claim is lent weight with a joke told about Perry, that 
                                                 
34 Kroon, “Make-Believe and Fictional Reference,” 207. 
35 Kroon, “Make-Believe and Fictional Reference,” 210. 
36 In a subsequent paper, Kroon argues for a sophisticated make-believe theory based on the distinction, in 
fictions, between pretend-reference for real proper names and reference for fictional proper names.  His solution 
relies on the significance of phrases such as as-he-is-in-the-movie and is not incompatible with that which I 
advance below.  See: Frederick Kroon, “A Problem About Make-Believe,” Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), 
201-229. 
37 Friend, “Real People in Unreal Contexts,” 189. 
38 Friend, “Real People in Unreal Contexts,” 191. 
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he never tells jokes.39  The response of the audience, amusement, is based on the fact that the 
real Perry is well known for telling jokes.  In other words, if one did not have the real Perry in 
mind – or if one does not know the real Perry – then the joke fails to be funny.  Friend’s 
argument is that the fictional-object theorist severs fiction from reality by stating that the 
fictions refer to the fictional characters, but engagement with the fictions discussed – Richard 
III, JFK, and her joke – is reliant upon audiences employing their knowledge of the real 
people represented.  Friend’s claim is thus that the fictional-object theorist cannot account for 
the joke being funny or the value of the way in which, for example, Hemingway weaves fact 
and fiction to produce a dramatic and realistic representation of the Spanish Civil War in For 
Whom the Bell Tolls.40  She concludes that the make-believe theory is therefore preferable to 
the fictional-object theory. 
 
The debate between Friend and Kroon reveals a problem for each: Friend cannot account for 
Garrison both hating and admiring himself and Kroon cannot account for the audience’s 
response to the story about Perry.  I employed, perhaps controversially, utterance theories of 
both fiction and literature in §1 and thus made a commitment to distinguishing between 
fiction and non-fiction in terms of connecting fiction and literature with the imagination – or 
make-believe – and non-fiction with belief.  My discussion of opacity and transparency made 
further use of this distinction, such that reading Hemingway involved imagining certain 
things about Marty while reading Beevor involved believing certain things about Marty.  I 
now want to compare my distinction with that of Kroon and Friend.  In my terminology, 
Kroon and Friend’s respective positions can be set out as follows: fictional-object theories are 
                                                 
39 Stacie Friend, “Real People in Unreal Contexts,” 192. 
40 Friend subsequently rejects the standard philosophical distinction between fiction and non-fiction in terms of 
make-believe and belief in favour of her theory that fiction and non-fiction constitute different genres, where 
genres are understood as ‘a way of classifying representations that guides appreciation’ (“Fiction as a Genre,” 
181).  The basis of her rejection is that make-believe is not restricted to fiction, i.e. both fictive and factive 
representations invite imaginings, a view which is supported by Matravers in Fiction and Narrative. 
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opaque because the real names refer to fictional/non-existent rather than real objects and 
Garrison can thus hate himself while admiring his fictional counterpart; make-believe 
theories are transparent because real names invite imagination de re, i.e. employ “Richard of 
Gloucester” and “Jim Garrison” in their fully extensional use. 
 
I claimed that the consequence of a thick interest in For Whom the Bell Tolls is that “Marty” 
in the novel refers to Marty-in-For-Whom-the-Bell-Tolls, i.e. the real Marty, but presented 
under the aspect that For Whom the Bell Tolls licences one to imagine.  “Marty” thus refers to 
Marty, but – contra Friend – does not employ the name in its full extension.  Understood in 
this way, literary thickness can solve both of the above problems.  Friend’s problem is solved 
because when Garrison watches Stone’s film he is indeed watching himself, but Garrison-in-
JFK, i.e. himself under the aspect JFK licences him to imagine.  There is no inconsistency 
with Garrison’s attitudes to himself and Garrison-in-JFK being different and the crime of 
libel concerns the exact opposite of Kroon’s example, i.e. an individual disliking the aspect 
under which they have been presented in a particular representation.41  Kroon’s problem is 
also solved, because “Perry” in Friend’s story is Perry-in-Friend’s-story and Friend’s story is 
funny because it licences to imagine of the real Perry, well known for his jokes, that he is 
humourless.  The incongruity between Perry and Perry-in-Friend’s-story is precisely what 
makes Friend’s story funny.42  The relation between real people, places, and events and the 
aspects under which they are presented in works of literature has been employed to great 
aesthetic effect by authors – a point to which I shall return in §6.  The advantage of a thick 
interest in For Whom the Bell Tolls is thus that it retains the link between work and world 
(severed by Kroon) without the demand for transparency (made by Friend), i.e. facilitates 
                                                 
41 Lamarque and Olsen offer an interesting discussion of the legal issues associated with Jilly Cooper’s Rivals in 
the same context (Truth, Fiction, and Literature, 119-121). 
42 As mentioned above, my conception of Garrison-in-JFK is similar to Kroon’s ‘Garrison as he is in JFK’ (“A 
Problem About Make-Believe,” 224).  
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make-believe with opacity and thus provides a convincing account of reference in literary 
fictions.     
 
5. Form, Content & Function 
 
Fundamental to the author’s intention – and therefore appreciation – is the idea that the 
appearance of a person, place, or event in a literary work serves a function within that work.  
It is not only the appearance of a person, place, or event which has one or more purposes, 
however, but also the way in which that person, place, or event is presented.  The question of 
why thus applies to both the what and the how.  The content of a work is formed just so for a 
reason; the specific combination of form and content is in each case deliberate.  Selectivity is 
a feature of all representations of sequences of events, both narrative and non-narrative.  In 
literary narratives, where the form is salient in addition to the content, this selectivity takes on 
an additional significance.  Aristotle comments on the relationship between selectivity and 
function when he praises Homer for his unity of plot in the Odyssey:  
 the plot of a play, being the representation of an action, must present it as a unified 
 whole; and its various incidents must be so arranged that if any one of them is 
 differently placed or taken away the effect of wholeness will be seriously disrupted.43   
If Homer could not present all of Odysseus’ story, why did he select the parts of that story 
which appear in the Odyssey?  Aristotle’s answer is that he selected the parts that are essential 
to the plot or structure of the work, those which serve a particular function (or more likely 
functions) within the work as a unified whole. 
 
                                                 
43 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. P. Murray & T.S. Dorsch in P. Murray (ed.), Classical Literary Criticism (London: 
Penguin, 2004), 57-97: VIII, 1451a33-36.  
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Lamarque states that the perspectival nature of literary narratives creates a ‘kind of “gestalt” 
of impressions and attitudes’.44  The narrative presents its content from a point of view and its 
particular combination of form and content will contribute to the gestalt that constitutes the 
work.  Lamarque calls this the principle of functionality: ‘broadly the idea that what is there 
(in the poem) is there for a purpose, things are not just accidentally as they are.’45  The 
principle applies to both literary narratives and poems, but is more prominent in the latter: 
 Reading poetry demands a sharper attention to detail than is characteristic of other 
 kinds of reading, not surprisingly as the form of expression – the actual choice of 
 words – is assigned unusual salience; that follows from the Principle of 
 Functionality.46 
While I am in agreement with Lamarque, I shall nonetheless make a slight amendment to the 
principle to draw attention to the significance of the relationship between literary form and 
literary content in both poetry and literary narratives: 
PRINCIPLE OF FUNCTIONALITY: the idea that what is in the work is there for a 
purpose, i.e. things are not just accidentally as they are.  The principle holds for all 
works of literature.  Every sentence, arguably every word, is assumed to have a 
function in the work as a unified whole, within the interplay of themes and the 
developing picture of people, places, and events that comprise the work’s content.   
 
To demand literary thickness of a work is to attend to the operation of this principle in the 
text, to the combination of the what and the how of the work in terms of the why.  In 
appreciating For Whom the Bell Tolls, therefore, one understands that Hemingway made a 
decision to include Marty as a character in his novel.  He also decided that Marty would be 
presented in a particular way.  The complexity of these choices is revealed in what is perhaps 
                                                 
44 Lamarque, Opacity of Narrative, 160. 
45 Lamarque, “Poetic Meaning,” 412. 
46 Lamarque, “Poetic Meaning,” 412. 
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the simplest part of this process, Hemingway’s decision to offer a brief physical description 
of Marty.  Given a desire for verisimilitude, the options seem fairly limited, and yet contrast 
Hemingway’s description with Beevor’s.  Hemingway mentions Marty’s eyebrows, eyes, and 
chin while Beevor mentions his physique, moustache, cheeks, and headgear.  Interestingly, 
the descriptions are both entirely different and completely compatible.  This array of choices 
would have increased exponentially when Hemingway decided which parts of Marty’s 
biography and which aspects of his personality to include in the narrative.  All these decisions 
about the what (or the who in this case) and the how are guided by the why.  Hemingway’s 
presentation of Marty under a particular aspect at a particular point in the narrative is 
designed to achieve a particular purpose – or purposes, in this case: at the level of the novel’s 
plot, Marty frustrates the delivery of Robert Jordan’s message, which is aimed at preventing 
the Republicans from launching an offensive for which the Nationalists are prepared; at the 
dramatic level, Marty’s appearance and intervention heightens the tension in the novel, the 
suspense as to whether the doomed offensive will or will not take place; at the thematic level, 
Marty heightens the sense of danger and distrust which permeates the entire novel, of people 
turning against their own in a civil conflict and betrayal by allies being as likely a cause of 
harm as enemy action.  There are thus at least three answers to the why, and to appreciate 
literature is to be concerned with the relationships between not only form and content, but 
form, content, and function.  Both the author’s intention and the reader’s response – where 
that response is appreciation – are guided by the principle of functionality. 
     
It is difficult to deny the role of this principle without threatening the very concept of 
literature.  In fact, the principle of functionality appears to hold not only for literature, but all 
art forms and artworks, and seems to have a necessary rather than contingent relation to art.  
The reason for this is the link to intentionality, as identified by Roger Scruton:   
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 Art provides a medium transparent to human intention, a medium for which the 
 question, Why? can be asked of every observable feature, even if it may sometimes 
 prove impossible to answer.47 
Even in non-essentialist theories of art, there is an assumption that the work is an intentional 
creation.  In the case of readymades like Duchamp’s Fountain, the urinal was intentionally – 
in Dickie’s institutional terminology – presented to the artworld public, and the same applies 
to readymades appropriated from nature.  Intentionality explains why the drawings of 
chimpanzees are not art and why a painted canvas that was indistinguishable from Pollock’s 
Autumn Rhythm would not be considered a work of art if it was the result of canvas and paint 
falling from a truck.  Art is bound up with the intention of an artist (or appropriator of 
readymades) and intentionality is bound up with the idea that every element of a work serves 
a function.48 
 
The principle of functionality is crucial to both authorial intention and literary appreciation 
and the demand for literary thickness constitutes the match between the intended and 
recognised functions of the elements in the work, i.e. not just the what and the how, but why 
the content is formed in a particular way in the work.  Given the importance of function to the 
relationship between form and content, literary thickness can be revised as follows:  
LITERARY THICKNESS II: an interest in a literary work that involves attending to the 
combination of form and content in terms of function, i.e. the forming of content and 
the function of that formed content.  Literary thickness is a demand which is satisfied 
by a work and is characteristic of literature such that if a work is a work of literature, 
it will reward the demand for literary thickness 
                                                 
47 Roger Scruton, “Photography and Representation,” Critical Inquiry 7 (1981), 577-603: 593.  
48 Note that in appreciating a work one can assume that every element has a function without assuming that the 
artist had an explicit intention regarding that function. 
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Thus understood, literary thickness constitutes the match between authorial intention and 
reader response characteristic of literary work.  In §§3-4, I showed that literary thickness 
provides a convincing account of fictional reference by combining make-believe with opacity 
and I have therefore demonstrated that literary thickness is a valuable tool of literary 
appreciation.  It may, however, be argued that I have stacked the odds in my favour by 
contrasting For Whom the Bell Tolls with The Spanish Civil War in my discussion of the 
contrasting interests readers bring to literature and history respectively.  In the final section, I 
shall discuss Peter Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang as the novel constitutes a more 
compelling potential counter-example to my claim about the value of literary thickness.   
 
6. True History of the Kelly Gang 
 
Notwithstanding the local subject-matter, True History of the Kelly Gang is an international 
bestseller and also won Carey his second Booker Prize.  The popular and critical success 
appears to be – at least partly – attributable to the peculiar relation between history and 
literature charted by the work.  Carey himself noted that early responses to the work were ‘as 
much as history as literature.  But there have been some more sophisticated readings of it’.49  
The mismatch between authorial intention and reader response is hardly surprising, as Paul 
Eggert explains:  
 Unsophisticated readers are liable to believe that Carey’s novel is a real 
 autobiography, printed from a manuscript actually written by Ned Kelly.  The first 
 edition bears many factitious markers of historical authenticity: imitation quarter-
 bound leather with the spine untitled as if it were an individually bound manuscript; 
 sections individually guillotined rather than as a whole quire, creating something like 
                                                 
49 Peter Carey cited in Nicholas Wroe, “Fiction’s Great Outlaw,” The Guardian, January 6, 2001, accessed 
February 20, 2014, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/jan/06/fiction.petercarey>. 
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 a rough, deckled-edge finish; and speckled endpapers and textured paper-stock 
 gesturing at the handmade.  The novel itself is divided, not into chapters, but what 
 purports to be a series of numbered manuscript parcels.50 
 
The most informed reason for confusing literature with autobiography is not Carey’s how, but 
his what.  Aside from presenting numerous historical events, and weaving history into 
literature, Carey has selected in Kelly precisely the man who might have written the 
autobiography the reader appears to hold.  Despite his lack of education – or perhaps because 
of it – Kelly was very much aware of the power of the press, and visited the office of the 
Ovens and Murray Advertiser to complain about his portrayal in the newspaper prior to being 
outlawed.  He dictated the Cameron Letter, a seventeen page, three and a half thousand word 
letter to Joe Byrne (the most literate member of his gang) vindicating his actions before the 
Euroa bank robbery in December 1878.  This was sent to Donald Cameron, a member of the 
Australian Legislative Assembly who had publicly criticised the police handling of the hunt 
for Kelly.  Prior to the raid on Jerilderie in February 1879, Kelly dictated a fifty-six page, 
seven and a half thousand word letter to Byrne, and attempted to have the Jerilderie Letter 
printed and published at gunpoint.  Neither of the letters reached the public due to concerns 
that they might result in popular support for Kelly’s cause – and an insurrection may indeed 
have been his intention.  Finally, Kelly dictated a letter to the Governor of Victoria six days 
before his execution, expressing his regret that he had been unable to make a fuller statement 
of his life and cause.51  Carey has seized the opportunity missed by Kelly, and produced a 
manuscript written under the premise of Kelly justifying his life to the daughter he has never 
met. 
 
                                                 
50 Paul Eggert, “The Bushranger’s Voice: Peter Carey’s ‘True History of the Kelly Gang’ (2000) and Ned 
Kelly’s ‘Jerilderie Letter’ (1879),” College Literature 34 (2007), 120-139: 123. 
51 Eggert, “The Bushranger’s Voice,” 126-130. 
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The daughter and her mother, Mary Hearn, are both fictional, but the history that emerges is 
an imaginative reconstruction of the life of a compassionate man doomed by social, economic 
– and possibly biological – influences to lead a life of violence, a course which he appears to 
have made every attempt to avoid.  I lack space to offer a précis of the narrative, or a detailed 
account of Kelly as a character in True History of the Kelly Gang, but the portrayal of his 
personality is essential to understanding the work – qua autobiography or qua literature – and 
the following extract is representative:  
 I’m sure you know that I have spilled human blood when there were no other choice 
 at that time I were no more guilty than a soldier in a war.  But if there was  a law 
 against the murder of a beast I would plead guilty and you would be correct to put the 
 black cap on your head for I killed my little heifer badly and am sorry for it still.  By 
 the time she fell her neck was a sea of laceration I will never forget the terror in her 
 eyes.52 
Kelly’s sensitivity to suffering and sense of responsibility are both conspicuous, extending 
even to an animal he is required to slaughter for food, and stand in stark contrast to his 
persona as a homicidal maniac following the murders at Stringybark Creek in October 1878.  
The treatment of his life in the narrative is stated succinctly and accurately by Mary in her 
comment on Kelly’s Cameron Letter: ‘she said there were not a soul alive who could read 
these words and blame me as the papers did.’53 
 
Bringing a thin interest to True History of the Kelly Gang is an easy error to make, but it 
remains an error because qua autobiography, the work is unsatisfying.  In fact, it stalls at the 
first hurdle: the premise of the work, the thread which links the parcels together, is Kelly’s 
relationship with Mary and his desire to communicate with their daughter – but both Mary 
                                                 
52 Peter Carey, True History of the Kelly Gang (London: Faber & Faber, 2001), 22. 
53 Carey, True History, 264. 
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and the daughter are Carey’s inventions.  The novel refers to the real Kelly and appears to be 
transparent, but even if the narrative in the first seven parcels is entirely accurate, the 
appearance of Mary in the eighth marks an unambiguous parting with history.  Yet Kelly’s 
meeting with Mary, their conception of a child, and the addressing of the parcels as a letter to 
that child are obviously significant to both the understanding and the appreciation of the 
novel.  I imagine that those unsophisticated readers who took a thin interest in the work and 
were inspired to research Kelly further would have been disappointed to discover that it 
contained such serious flaws qua history. 
     
I mentioned that Carey binds fact and fiction together in his work, and the method is 
employed to the extent that he actually appropriates sentences from the Jerilderie Letter.54  
The following two passages describe the same incident; the first is written by Kelly, the 
second by Carey:  
 (1) Mrs McCormack, “turned on me...I did not say much to the woman as my  
  Mother was present but that same day me and my uncle was cutting calves 
  Gould wrapped up a note and a pair of the calves testicles and gave them to 
  me to give them to Mrs Mc Cormack....consequently Mc Cormack said he  
  would summons me...He said I was a liar & he could welt me or any of my 
  breed I was about 14 years of age but accepted the challenge And dismounting 
  when Mrs Mc Cormack struck my horse in the flank with a bullock’s shin it 
  jumped forward and my fist came in collision with Mc Cormack’s nose And 
                                                 
54 Eggert, “The Bushranger’s Voice,” 131. 
23 
 
  caused him to loose [sic] his equilibrium and fall postrate.55 (McDermott  
  2001, 3-6)”.56 
 (2) Then Mrs McCormick came rushing down the steps wielding a bullock’s  
  shinbone she must of picked up on the way.  Mr McCormick followed behind 
  her shouting out I were despised everyone in the district he said I were a  
  coward and were hiding behind my mother’s skirts.  At this insult I  
  dismounted.  Mrs McCormick then struck my horse on the flank with her  
  impertinent weapon and the horse jumped forward and as I were holding the 
  rein it caused my fist to come into collision with McCormick’s nose and he 
  lost his equilibrium and fell prostrate.  Tying up my horse to finish the battle I 
  seen Cons Hall descend from the pub like a glistening old spider gliding down 
  from the centre of its web.57 
 
The first point to note is that although Carey writes in a vernacular similar to that which 
Kelly used, he does not replicate Kelly’s diction exactly.  The narrator of the parcels in True 
History of the Kelly Gang writes in a manner which is close enough to Kelly’s actual style to 
maintain verisimilitude while making effective use of tropes and an understated expression of 
emotion.  The idiosyncratic morphology and poor syntax are initially quite jarring: single-
sentence paragraphs are composed of staccato phrases and clauses and there are no quotation 
marks to indicate direct speech.  The mode of presentation engenders the experience of all 
thirteen parcels as something of an extended interior monologue, in spite of the numerous 
conversations that occur.  Once one is attuned to the unruly grammar, however, the loss of 
clarity becomes a small price to pay for the lyrical quality of the prose, which at times 
                                                 
55 There is no “sic” after “postrate”, but the error is Kelly’s rather than Eggert’s.  Eggert quotes from the first 
printed transcription of the Jerilderie Letter, which appears in Alex McDermott’s The Jerilderie Letter 
(Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 2001). 
56 Kelly cited in Eggert, “The Bushranger’s Voice,” 127. 
57 Carey, True History, 159. 
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resembles the finest stream of consciousness writing and creates the desire for recital rather 
than reading.58  As a literary device, the narration of the novel is an essential part of the 
invitation to regard Kelly with sympathy as well as the force behind the forward-motion of 
the plot. 
 
The second point to note is the implausibility of this incident in both accounts.  Despite 
Kelly’s claim about his age, he was probably sixteen when the clash with McCormick 
occurred – already physically capable, and no stranger to violence.59  McCormick’s insult is a 
dire one as the opinion of many of Kelly’s associates is that he has erotic feelings for his 
mother.60  There is no question that he intends to administer a beating to McCormick, and the 
description of Kelly’s fist “accidentally” hitting McCormick’s nose so hard that he knocks 
him down is unconvincing to the extent that – assuming this defence – the consequent 
custodial sentence comes as no surprise.  Even if this particular incident did occur exactly as 
recorded in both of the above accounts, Carey casts doubt as to the reliability of Kelly’s 
narration throughout the novel: his first shooting involves an unlikely suicidal charge by Bill 
Frost which leaves Kelly no choice but to shoot him;61 Mary is so certain of Kelly’s 
homicidal temper that she drugs him to prevent him murdering the father of her son;62 at 
Stringybark Creek, a reluctant and regretful Kelly single-handedly kills three policemen 
                                                 
58 I do not have space to reproduce more of Carey’s prose, but paradigmatic examples are: the description of 
Harry Power at Kelly’s first robbery (True History, 70), Kelly’s first sight of Mary (True History, 201), and the 
description of Kelly’s mother after she has tried to shoot her partner, who has fathered Mary’s child (True 
History, 219).  
59 In fairness, Kelly’s precise date of birth is unknown, so the error may be due to his ignorance – or poor recall 
of event which had occurred just over eight years beforehand – rather than deliberate misrepresentation. 
60 See, for example: True History, 187, 193, 287 & 308.  Carey’s Kelly does not have a physical relationship 
with his mother, but he certainly has an unnaturally strong attachment to a woman who demonstrates very little 
concern for him and betrays him several times.  Ultimately Kelly chooses his mother over Mary, refusing to 
escape to America with her and their child. 
61 Carey, True History, 118. 
62 Carey, True History, 215. 
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while his three compatriots kill none.63  When Kelly is outlawed the conflict escalates, and 
Carey establishes a subtle distance between reader and narrator such that one realises that one 
is no longer privy to Kelly’s innermost thoughts, which in turn calls into question whether 
one ever was.  His letter threatening to kill any resident of Victoria who assists the police in 
any way is shocking in both its violence and its hubris.  Kelly concludes: 
 I DO NOT WISH TO GIVE THE ORDER FULL FORCE WITHOUT GIVING 
 TIMELY WARNING BUT I AM A WIDOW’S SON OUTLAWED AND MUST BE 
 OBEYED.64               
This is no longer the voice of the courageous but doomed victim of circumstances with whom 
one thinks one is familiar.  The whole insurrection, which is such an important part of Kelly’s 
life, is described in very little detail, except for the motive, which is to force the authorities to 
release his mother from prison.  Again, there is a darkness and an arrogance that has not 
previously been disclosed – which is, of course, precisely what one would expect in a man 
who is attempting to justify his actions to a daughter whom he is likely never to meet.      
 
True History of the Kelly Gang is thus not a straightforward sympathetic account, a history 
told from Kelly’s point of view.  Carey’s work is instead Kelly’s story: it is history in a literal 
sense; his story, told by him.  The first clue to the complexity of the novel is in the title, the 
missing definite article before “true”.  This could reflect a grammatical error on the part of 
the uneducated narrator, but has a deeper significance in drawing attention to the first two 
words of the title.  On a popular understanding, “true history” is redundant because if a 
history is not factual, then it is fictional and fails to qualify as history.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
63 Carey, True History, 237-244.  The description of this incident is much more plausible than the McCormick 
and Frost confrontations, but following on from them as it does nonetheless contributes to the feeling that Kelly 
might not be telling the whole truth in his “true history”. 
64 Carey, True History, 329.  This sentence is actually appropriated from the Jerilderie Letter.  See: Eggert, “The 
Bushranger’s Voice,” 128-129. 
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Eggert65 quotes Carey’s claim to have deliberately selected the title for the purpose of 
signalling that the work is not a history – the idea being that contemporary professional 
historians are sceptical about the transparency of history.  Whichever understanding one has 
of “true history”, that it protests too much or that it is oxymoronic, the title serves to direct 
attention to the history-in-the-novel and the function the history-in-the-novel serves. 
 
The form selected by Carey – the parcels, with their detailed notes, sandwiched between 
historical writing and the curious description of Kelly’s death – interrupts the flow of Kelly’s 
vernacular and disrupts the imaginative engagement with the novel, drawing attention in an 
explicit and overt manner to the purported historical character of the work.  This effect is 
exacerbated at further points in the narrative: Kelly slips into the third person when he 
describes his apprenticeship to Harry Power66 and the related discovery of his mother’s 
betrayal;67 he also describes events where he acknowledges his absence.68  Most telling, 
however, are the reproduction of newspaper articles with annotations, first by Mary,69 and 
then Kelly himself.70  One reads the newspaper articles with notes about their inaccuracy and 
is at the same time aware that the novel itself simultaneously represents and misrepresents 
historical events.  The introduction to the eighth parcel casts a further doubt as to narrative 
veracity: ‘Pages describing the shooting of Constable Fitzpatrick are much revised by a 
second hand reliably presumed to be that of Joe Byrne.’71  Finally, there is Kelly’s own 
commentary on the relation between history and truth, which includes passages such as the 
following:        
                                                 
65 Eggert, “The Bushranger’s Voice,” 123. 
66 Carey, True History, 62-67. 
67 Carey, True History, 90. 
68 Carey, True History, 265-269. 
69 Carey, True History, 291-296. 
70 Carey, True History, 309-312. 
71 Carey, True History, 183. 
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 In the hut at Faithful’s Creek I seen proof that if a man could tell his true   
 history to Australians he might be believed it is the clearest sight I ever seen  
 and soon Joe seen it too.72 
 
I am not suggesting that True History of the Kelly Gang is not a sympathetic account of 
Kelly’s life.  It is, and despite the suggestions that he is not above omission or deception, 
there is no doubt that one comes to understand the situation in which Kelly and other poor 
immigrants – many of whom were either deported from the United Kingdom or the 
descendants of deportees – found themselves.  For many Irish immigrants, like the Kellys, the 
one-sided conflict between landlords and peasants at home was simply relocated and 
reproduced in the colonial conflict between squatters and selectors.  Carey’s novel achieves 
something more than showing Kelly’s side of the story, however: it presents his story, 
suggests that while a great deal of that story is probably true, some of it is probably not, and 
leaves the reader to pass his or her own judgement.  To read the work qua literature is to 
accept Carey’s explicit invitation to attend to the history-in-the-novel, and the function the 
combination of formal devices and historical content serves within this telling of Kelly’s 
story as his story.  This is, of course, to make a demand for literary thickness, to be concerned 
with not only the historical people, places, and events in the novel, but also how they are 
portrayed, why they are portrayed in that way, and their significance beyond the immediate 
context of Victorian Australia. 
 
I chose True History of the Kelly Gang as work that appears to reward a thin rather than thick 
interest from readers.  The novel also shows precisely what is wrong with fictional-object 
theories of fictional reference.  If Kelly-in-True-History-of-the-Kelly-Gang is a fictional 
                                                 
72 Carey, True History, 299. 
28 
 
object then Carey’s novel ceases to refer to the real Kelly, and it becomes difficult to see how 
the careful relation between fact and fiction to which I have alluded above could be relevant 
to an appreciation of the novel.  Interestingly, a similar criticism could be made of formalist 
literary theories, such as those advanced by the New Critics.  Both the fictional-object and 
formalist theorists separate work and world to some extent, despite the fact that the former 
hold pro-reference and the latter non-reference views of literature.  The severing of the work 
from the world proposed by Beardsley means that appreciation is focused on form alone 
rather than form, content, and function, but if the novel did not refer to the real Kelly then the 
formal features employed by Carey could have no more than a superficial significance.  The 
novel refers to the real people it names, but the combination of form and content produces 
opacity, such that one does not imagine Kelly in his full extension, but under the aspect 
licenced by Carey.  My conclusion is that despite appearances to the contrary the demand for 
literary thickness is rewarded by True History of the Kelly Gang.  If one accepts the necessity 
of the principle of functionality in all literary works, as suggested in §5, then this conclusion 
can be extended beyond Carey’s novel.  As such, literary thickness is the appropriate demand 
to make of all works characterised by an authorial intention for literary appreciation.73 
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